Multi-Persona Anonymity

Recently Janet Vertesi, an assistant professor of sociology at Princeton University, tried to hide her pregnancy from the internet.  While she found it was extremely hard and some have questioned the value of going to the trouble, I believe her experiment may be seminal.  Here's why.

Anonymity vs Privacy
But before the why, a little discussion of privacy and anonymity.  There has been much debate about privacy, but it is assuredly dead.  This report proves it.  None of the things Janet did were private.  Each was logged, tracked, analyzed.  However, they were anonymous in that they were not correlated back to a central persona; to her.  I think this is the fundamental difference between privacy and anonymity.  Privacy means no-one or few know what you did.  Anonymity means no-one or few know it was you.

What Janet did was anonymity.  Her purchases were tracked and shared.  Her browsing habits were tracked and shared.  Her purchases were associated with an anonymous address, (an Amazon delivery locker).  Of the things she did, communicating her pregnancy by phone or in person was probably the only private thing she did.  Even that was probably not a great idea as the metadata from the phone calls and the phone call content it's self could easily have been recorded.

Why What She Did Was Important
What Janet did was seminal:

1. She proved you could could disassociate multiple personal personas through anonymity.  Something that is no longer possible through privacy.
2. She identified the touch points necessary to disassociate and proved they could be disassociated, at least for a short period.

To expand on the first bullet, people think they want privacy.  They don't.  They want to do things without everyone knowing they did them.  That will never again be accomplished through privacy.  However, it can be accomplished through anonymity.  The trick is to maintain multiple disjointed personas.  In this case, Janet had two: "a pregnant woman" and "indeterminately pregnant Janet".  However, people could have multiple personas: "Work", "Family", "Hobbies", etc.  All kept completely separate.

The 'how' of keeping them completely separate is captured in number two of what Janet did.  She determined what the touch points were. As an example:

1. Communication
2. Physical interaction.  (In this case transfer of goods)
3. Economic interaction
4. Authentication

She also identified ways of dealing with all of these: in-person communication, amazon lockers, pre-paid debit cards/cash, separate email addresses to create accounts with.  Unfortunately, there are multiple issues with what she identified such as monetary limits, potentially monitored phone calls, physically accessing the amazon locker, etc.  This is where the technology community needs to come together.

The Future
We need to stop trying to ensure privacy and instead start trying to ensure anonymity between personas.  We already have the building blocks.  Bitcoin provides economic interaction.  VPNs, anonymizing proxies, TOR, etc provide communications.  Crypto-currency based identities such as namecoin can provide anonymous identities for personas to authenticate against.  Even physical interaction could be anonymized through things like full-body suits.  Just such a physical situation is envisioned in the movie Surrogates.  However, we need to make anonymizing multiple personas the explicit goal of the tools we create to ensure they provide the security we desire.

This does not eliminate the need for privacy.  There will be locations where a person's personas interact.  Historically, this is a person's home.  This is why it receives unique legal protection.  However, this could also be a business model, allowing people to change personas, allow interaction between personas or shed/create personas in privacy.  This would likely be a physical facility with little to no monitoring behind closed doors. An example even exists in the Game of Thrones universe.

Ultimately, it will end in an arms race.  Those hoping to attempting to associate different personas will compete against those maintaining different personas and the projects to produce the tools to allow them to do so.  However, as the abuse of breaches of privacy become more egregious, the practice of strictly maintaining multiple personas will become more socially acceptable and the act of attempting to associate personas more malevolent.

In Summary
What Janet did is seminal and should open our eyes to the world we really live in.  The sooner we start work on maintaining separate personas, the sooner we may be able to enjoy the benefits we will never again get from privacy.

Of Vulnerabilities and Bullets

Where I explain why no-one cares about the vulnerability you found.

I've had many people try to convince me that infosec vulnerabilities are the base unit of infosec.  My experience is that vulnerabilities are something, but not much.

But lets talk guns.  Everyone has heard the saying, "Guns don't kill people, people kill people."  Probably more accurate would be that bullets kill people, but only in very specific situations.  There must be a gun, a target (in the same area) and a threat actor to pull the trigger to go with that bullet.

Vulnerabilities are about the same thing.  Vulnerabilities are like bullets.  They play a part, but no more.  The same way their are innumerable bullets out there yet very few ever kill people, there are innumerable vulnerabilities, yet very few are used to realize a risk.   This is because, just like a bullet, a vulnerability must exist in a greater context that makes it part of a risk that a threat actor can exploit and an impact that matters.  And of course the threat actor must exist to pull the trigger.

So, as a security researcher, if you feel that your vulnerabilities are not taken seriously, don't just consider the vulnerability when presenting it.  Consider the context the vulnerability is likely to exist in.  Consider whether a threat actor even exists to exploit the vulnerability.

If they do, convince people.  Show them where similar vulnerabilities have been exploited by threat actors.  Show them where the vulnerability helps known threat actors realize their stated goals.  Show them how the only part of the context preventing exploitation is that the threat actor simply hasn't made it to their organization.

Only then will the vulnerability matter.

Infosec, It's About What You Think You Know

Both the current core failure of infosec defense and it's ultimate success are fundamentally tied to what you think you know. Let me explain.

First and foremost: We don't lose because of vulnerabilities. We lose because we believe we are in one infosec state, and the threat realizes we are in a different, more vulnerable, state. That means that it's not whether or not the vulnerable condition exists that matters, it's whether the threat actor knows it does and we think it doesn't.

Second, if losing is about believing you are in one security state when you are in another, winning is about the threat actor believing they are in an infosec state when they are actually in another. We make this happen in the one place we control: our network.

Currently, threat actors can operate with impunity because our network is operating the way the threat actor believes it's operating. To tip the balance of power in infosec conflict, we need the network to be operating differently than the threat actor believes it's operating. To do that, we need to do a few things:

1. We need to treat the SIEM like a big data warehouse. Our SIEM should be a network telemetry data warehouse. It needs to receive as much alert data as possible through integration layers capable of dealing with the specific data types being inputted. It needs to be able to pull in additional associated data. In the data marts, it needs to detect not just malice, but any activity outside of the normal network profile. (This leads to a separate question of how to profile a network which I'll leave for another post.)
2. The network telemetry data warehouse needs to be able to correlate detected anomalies with other data to piece together the picture of what is happening. Understanding the relationships between observations is critical to understanding the ground truth of the conflict.
3. Most important, it needs to have a feedback loop; changing how the network is operating based on what the SIEM believes is anomalous or malicious. When potential malice is detected, it needs to take a different route though the network. Malice needs to have different rules applied to it's traffic. It needs to have different tools applied to delaying the threat, gathering intelligence, and responding to the threat to prevent negative impacts. This can all be accomplished in an automated feedback loop so that the network is pitching itself against any anomalous behavior.

On the network of the future, the network is not a static battlefield, but a living, pulsating thing. The network uses the massive amount of telemetry data at it's disposal and broad flexibility provided by Software Defined Networking and virtualization to respond to perceived threats. It put threat actors at the same type of disadvantage that defenders currently face. And, ultimately, the advantage in infosec conflict will pitch in defense's favor because threat actors will be unable to trust that the network environment they believe they are operating in is the true network state.

Gabe's Three Assumptions of Risk Assessment. i.e. the Chain of Trust

Over the years of discussing vulnerable conditions and risks, I've come up with three assumptions which help ground the risk assessment in reality:

1. If the threat actor has superuser privilege, they can realize the risk.  (This one has some caveats, however exceptions to this rule are so rarely implemented they are likely to not matter in any practical cases.)
1. This might not apply if you have immutable files
2. Off-host logging may detect the threat actor
2. If the threat actor has physical access, they can deny availability.
3. If the threat actor has unlimited physical access, they can gain superuser.  (see Assumption 1)

This could probably be summed up with a single concept:  the Chain of Trust.  In this case we are implying that the system's security is based on superuser's security and the system and superuser are based on the physical security.  If you haven't secured this chain of trust, any security established farther on in the chain is moot. 

I believe Dan Kaminsky's take is, "If you have root, you can get root" (paraphrased).  So when doing risk assessments, if at any point you assume the threat actor has compromised something farther back in the Chain of Trust, the rest of the line of reasoning is at issue.

As an example:  "If the threat actor pushes the power button on the computer, they could turn it off and shut everything down.  Therefore we should lock the power button." This assumes the threat has physical access in which they could pull the cables out of the computer, hit the emergency power off, or do any number of other things.

Alternately: "The bad guy can run code that can read all memory, so lets encrypt the data in memory."  This implies the threat already has superuser privileges and so could simply prevent the encryption, read prior to encryption, or copy the encryption key and decrypt.

So whether you are assessing risk or planning mitigations, remember the Assumptions and remember the Chain of Trust.

P.S. The Chain of Trust was not my idea but one that I got from Travis Howerton at Innovalysis.  It just fit well in explaining the three assumptions.

Infosec Strategy in 1

Target, Neiman Marcus, Microsoft, and many, many more...

Corporate America has a huge security problem.  And it's not compromises.  It's a lack of strategic vision in cyber security.

With a never-ending litany of massive breaches, organizations are spending so much time trying to put fingers in the dikes, that no-one is stepping back to look at the whole levee.  Websites being compromised?  Buy WAFs.  Point of sale being compromised?  Put more tools on the PCI LAN. China hacking people?  Get a cyber intelligence feed.  PHI/PII being leaked to pastebin?  Get DLP.  No-one stops to ask the question, "Do these fit together?"  And when you don't, your infosec defense looks like this:

Friday’s Friendly Funny by Dave Blazek is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivs 3.0 United States License.

Before thinking about point solutions, an organization must come up with a strategy.  I would suggest a Strategy Statement such as:

Delay threat actors from realizing risks until they give up or are detected and responded to.  Respond effectively.  Degrade gracefully and remediate effectively when threat actors realize risks.

The above single statement sum up an entire infosec program, laying out specific steps that can be used to plan and measure the program.  Yours doesn't need to be the same, but it needs to be a clear and concise statement you can make measurable progress against.  This one lays out base truths:

• That the program will be operations driven.
• That risk is a fundamental element of the security program (You can read some of my views on risk here, here, here, and here.)
• That the fundamental measurement of effectiveness is Delay vs Detection & Response.
• That the organization should expect to operate in and recover from a compromised environment.

It also establishes the stages of incident life-cycle that drive the strategy:

1. Delay
2. Detect
3. Respond
4. Remediate

Calling the first step Delay is meant to be a bit controversial.  I think normally it would be 'deny', 'protect', 'deter', or something else.  However, as a community, we need to get out of the idea that if we just build it secure enough, the threat will go away and never come back.  Obviously, not all threats will stick with their attack, however we need to plan our strategy for the ones that do and those are the cases where all we are doing is delaying.

This is a statement we can easily track progress against in one, easy to read, table:

Infosec Defense Execution Strategy

You can download the Infosec Defense Execution Strategy spreadsheet including an example. We also add reporting and after action review to the stages.  The states can easily be modified to meet an organization's process.  The Defensive Execution Strategy also breaks each step out into discrete levels of completion:

1. Define (Document what you want to do)
2. Build (Create anything you need to do it)
3. Train (Practice doing it)
4. Grade (Measure how well you do it)
5. (There is an implicit 5th step that, if you find any deficiencies in your grading you feed the measurement back into improving the step where the deficiency can be rectified.)

Within the levels of completion we define two specific things:  Who and What.  Without who, it is unclear as to who will actually get the work done.  If an organization doesn't know who will get the work done, you can almost guarantee no-one will do it.  A good model to use is RACI: Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed.

'What' is also critical to tracking the strategy.  There needs to be deliverables which clearly show that a step has been performed. Managing based on deliverables significantly simplifies tracking of progress.  In the same vain, you need to know what products need to exist prior to starting a step.  If you don't, you have no way of measuring if you are ready to begin or not.  Ultimately the topic of management by deliverables could fill a book.

From this one table of levels of completion above, all information security projects can be planned.  This also helps keep the organization focused on more than just the 'build' step.  

And each stage can be decomposed.  Delay may be broken down into:

1. Preventing incidents
2. Operating in a compromised environment

Detection may be broken down into:

1. Internal awareness
2. External intelligence
3. Prioritizing potential malice to investigate
4. Facilitating correlation of prioritized information

(As an aside, #3 and #4 above are a fundamentally new way of looking at DFIR that is not yet widely adopted and deserves it's own post.)

All projects and all security requirements should be traceable to the Strategy Statement through the Infosec Defense Execution Strategy and the various levels of decomposition.  With this as a starting point, organizations can see how all of their projects and requirements fit together, identify gaps, and form a unified defense that looks less like the first picture and more like this:

Image by Hao Wei, licensed licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.

Offense and Defense in your Infosec Department

It is now generally accepted that our job as infosec professionals is not to prevent compromise but to defend against it and operate in a compromised environment.  With that understanding the DFIR/infosec operations staff are the front lines of information security.

The operations team could be thought of as a sports team.  They need the right equipment, but nothing takes the place of practice.  And to practice you need a good practice squad.

Most large infosec departments have the staff to do this.  We have staff skilled in evaluating the security of products and tools.  Unfortunately, this body of staff is primarily focused on the acquisition side of infosec.

To fix this, lets switch things up a bit.  We probably already have 3 teams in infosec:

1. Operations - DFIR responsibilities (they'll be the blue team)
2. Engineering - Risk and Compliance responsibilities (they'll be the red team)
3. Architecture - Stategic vision (they'll be the white team)

In this model, operation's primary role is to prevent, identify and remediate incidents.  Their secondary role is to generate high-level security needs and provide them to Architecture for implementation.

Engineering's primary role is to validate that security requirements are appropriate implemented in a product's design and to assess the risk of those not implemented.  Their secondary role, however, is to attack Operations.  Because their skill set should be the ability to identify security vulnerabilities, a measurable amount of their time should be used attacking the internal network.  

In this way, we pit operations against engineering in friendly blue vs red battle.  Both teams benefit from the continuous training and the enterprise information system benefits from the identification of security weaknesses that can be remediated.  If you play both offense and defense on your home network, when attackers come to your turf, they shouldn't stand a chance.

Architecture plays the final role.  Their primary role is to help translate Operations' needs into requirements and then into designs.  They also play the white cell role, providing an unbiased referee for the competition between Engineering and Operations.

In this way, we keep the task of operationally defending the network forefront in everyone's mind.  We also make sure that the security we build is truly derived from operational needs rather than 'gut feelings' about what should be bought.  We merge operations and acquisition into a single process without adding any additional organizations.  And because of it, everyone benefits.

Unflattening a Flat Network – Adventures in Network Segmentation

In October I had the honor of speaking at the Lancope Vision conference about my experience in network segmentation.  I have spent the last few months establishing a program to segment a very large network.  It is based heavily on netflow and algorithmic identification of where enclaves should be.  I have finally cleaned up the slides for publishing.  Please read the notes along with each slide as they will be hard to understand otherwise.

Unflattening a Flat Network – Adventures in Network Segmentation:Slides

(EDIT: Video of the talk can be found at http://vimeo.com/78941693)

Since giving the talk, I have done additional work.  I am currently working on other methods for cluster creation as well as identifying the interactions between clusters to help identify groupings of hosts.  This all also eventually leads to algorithmic profiling of a network, predominantly the legitimate usage.  The profiling algorithms could then easily be run against packet captures of malicious network traffic and new traffic compare to both the legitimate and malicious profiles to identify malice on a network.  This work is still ongoing.